GOB MEDIA

Cadaankii oo Madowgii usoo dhigtay. USA,UK,Australia White Vs Black, Brown, Yellow, Green

Halyey — Thu, 25 Jun 2015 21:20:30 GMT

Buuba oo 26 Sanno Kadib ogaaday in Somaliweyn tahay riyo waxaan jirin, Xamarna tahay kawaanka Lagu gawraaco dadka aan u dhalan Xamar

Halyey — Thu, 18 Jun 2015 16:44:44 GMT

Ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims by the government in Myanmar

Halyey — Sun, 31 May 2015 10:48:30 GMT

China Comes to Djibouti,Why Washington Should be Worried

Halyey — Sat, 02 May 2015 13:04:18 GMT

The tiny African nation of Djibouti is the unsung hero in the United States’ ongoing war against terror and piracy. A few security scares notwithstanding—the U.S. embassy was briefly closed earlier this month for unexplained reasons—the country is a rare oasis of stability in the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonnier hosts U.S. Special Forces, fighter planes, and helicopters, and is a major base for drone operations in Yemen and Somalia. Small wonder that Washington recently renewed its lease on the base for ten years (with an option to extend for another ten), even though Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh nearly doubled the rent.Mapbox

The United States’ investment in Djibouti, which amounts to more than $70 million per year including economic aid, is money well spent. Washington needs Djibouti—and Guelleh knows that all too well. France, Germany, and Japan have also handed over tens of millions of dollars to the country for the right to use its strategic real estate. And lately, China has gotten in on the act too—not only for economic reasons, but also driven by apparent security considerations. Money talks, especially in small and underdeveloped states run by authoritarian governments such as Djibouti—and soon Beijing, not Washington, may have the strongest voice.

Beijing’s interest in Africa is immense. Bilateral trade between China and the continent already exceeds $200 billion, far above Africa’s commerce with the European Union or the United States. In addition, China has long sought to strengthen its ground-level influence in places it considers strategic chokepoints. As such, it now has economic, political, and military deals with a number of African states, including Algeria (which has significant oil and gas reserves and is near the Suez Canal), and other countries rich in energy resources, including Ethiopia and Nigeria. Djibouti recently joined this list, concluding a security and defense agreement with Beijing in early 2014. The Chinese official responsible for negotiating and, presumably, executing the deal was Defense Minister Chang Wanquan, the person behind his country’s increasingly assertive conduct in the South China Sea.

Washington protested against the China–Djibouti pact and expressed concern over China’s plans to build a military base in the Obock region, but to no avail. That’s hardly surprising in light of the huge economic package that Beijing offered Guelleh. In the run-up to the deal, China Merchant Holdings, a sizable state-owned enterprise, purchased a large stake in the country’s vital Port of Djibouti, spending $185 million. To further drum up enthusiasm, Beijing threw in an offer to develop the port’s facilities—awarding the state-owned China State Construction Engineering Corporation a $420-million contract to begin this work—as well as improve the infrastructure that supports the port’s functioning, including a railway to Ethiopia and two international airports.

From China’s point of view, the move to offer commercial incentives in the hopes of gaining future strategic and military access comes from a time-tested playbook. Beijing has undertaken similar plays in Bangladesh, Myanmar (also called Burma), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—even if they have not always borne strategic fruit. But in its approach to Djibouti, China has an even stronger strategic advantage than usual: Maritime ports are Djibouti’s only valued economic asset, apart from its military and logistical facilities. A promise to spend a fortune on developing Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure is thus an offer to bankroll the only national business plan the country has.

Beijing has also learned another lesson from its checkbook diplomacy in South Pacific: to win over corrupt authoritarian governments overseeing moribund economies, practice economic seduction at both national and personal levels. To that end, China’s investment in a given country’s infrastructure often goes hand-in-hand with personal favors: building grand residences for state leaders, as China most recently did in Sudan, or at least constructing fancy fences around them, as it has done in Fiji. This explains why Beijing treats Djiboutian government figures as leaders of global significance, hosting joint grand summits with them that would be more befitting of leaders of global power. Such gestures, designed to stroke individual egos, can go a long way when these individuals have a disproportionate and unaccountable hold over power and wealth in their countries—as Guelleh and his top aides do in Djibouti.

But the examples of the Pacific Island nations also illustrate that in return for its largess, Beijing eventually demands significant rewards. China’s economic partners throughout Asia (including Myanmar) and Africa (including Nigeria and Sudan) have already learned the hard way that the benefits of Chinese-led economic activity rarely trickle down to the local populations, and that China has little regard for the environmental and social damage left behind. But it will take time for Djibouti to acquire that wisdom, and for the moment, it is increasingly seeing not dollar but renminbi signs.

Meanwhile, the United States is not without leverage, even given Washington’s lack of attention to the country. No state would want its strategic options reduced to becoming China’s client—which is something that Washington should privately emphasize when it next talks to Guelleh. Plus the United States enjoys the advantage of collective bargaining. It should coordinate its demands with its strategic allies, including France, Germany, and Japan, and it should prepare its partners to jointly take money off the table in any future negotiations—or add more to the pile if their strategic interests so demand. If it doesn’t, Washington might find that the country hosting its only military base in sub-Saharan Africa owes more favors to China, its rising global rival, than to the United States itself.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-africa/2015-04-23/china-comes-djibouti?cid=rss-africa-china_comes_to_djibouti-000000

Tensions Escalate Between Russia And The West

Halyey — Sun, 05 Apr 2015 20:31:49 GMT

Yemeni Houthis seize airbase in advance on Aden

Halyey — Wed, 25 Mar 2015 17:38:59 GMT

Yemen's Houthi rebels have advanced towards Aden, where President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has been holed up since fleeing the capital Sanaa last month.

Before moving closer to the coastal city on Wednesday, rebels seized an airbase that until a few days ago was used by US troops deployed in the fight against al-Qaeda.

The al-Anad base, 60km from Aden, had since been occupied by Yemeni government forces.

The advance of the Houthis threatens to plunge the Arab world's poorest country into a civil war that could draw in its Gulf neighbours. Already, Hadi has asked the UN to authorise a foreign military intervention in the country.

Yemeni Foreign Minister Ryiad Yassin repeated the call for military action in an interview with Al Jazeera on Wednesday.

"We want direct military intervention, especially by air force, to stop the advance of Houthis on the ground," Yassin said in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. He also dismissed attempts to reach a solution to Yemen's crisis through dialogue, alleging that UN envoy Jamal Benomar had given "legitimacy to the Houthi coup".

Hadi established a temporary capital in Aden after fleeing from house arrest at the hands of the rebels in Sanaa earlier in March.

The Shia rebels, who say they are fighting for more rights for their Zaidi community, have taken over large parts of Yemen since last year.

Airport closed

As the situation in Aden escalated on Wednesday, the city's airport was shut down due to security concerns. Sources told Al Jazeera that Brigade 39, loyal to overthrown President Ali Abdallah Saleh and allied with the Houthis, took control of the airport, leading to suspension of flights there.

There were conflicting reports on Hadi's whereabouts as witnesses said gunfire was heard close to his residence.

Witnesses speaking to the Associated Press said they saw a convoy of presidential vehicles leaving Hadi's palace, located at the top of a hill in Aden overlooking the Arabian Sea.

Presidential officials speaking to the news agency said Hadi was in an operations room overseeing his forces' response to the Houthi offensive but declined to say where that facility is located.

Other reports sugegsted Hadi had left the city by boat.

In Sanaa, Yemen's state TV, now controlled by the Houthis, made an offer of nearly $100,000 for Hadi's capture.

Summer Nasser, a human rights activist speaking to Al Jazeera from Aden, said Hadi "left his compound but we do not know where he is".

"There are gun shots close to the compound, but we cannot confirm who is fighting who or if there are Houthis troops on the ground there," she said.

"There have been military jets patrolling around the compound," she said.

Meanwhile, Houthis said that their forces captured Defence Minister Mahmud al-Subaihi as they advanced towards Aden.

"Subaihi was arrested in the city of Houta" in Lahij province, rebel spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam said in a statement aired by their Al-Massira television.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the report.

Diplomatic missions of Hadi's Arab Gulf allies, including Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait, have evacuated their diplomatic staff from Aden over the past few days, officials said.

They earlier evacuated from Sanaa and relocated to Aden to support Hadi.

Saud Al Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, has warned that his country would take "necessary measures" if the Houthis did not resolve the crisis peacefully, without elaborating further.

Al Jazeera

Wasiirka Arimaha Dibada Somaliland oo waraysi Siiyay idaacadaha Dalka Kenya

Halyey — Sun, 22 Mar 2015 20:05:30 GMT

Cali Samatar oo Lagu helay Danbiyo Dagaal iyo Xasuuq

Halyey — Sun, 22 Mar 2015 19:58:40 GMT

<article> <h1>Somaliland dismisses more talks with Somalia without int'l mediations</h1> <p>Halyey — Wed, 18 Mar 2015 20:27:42 GMT</p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">Two weeks after talks between Somalia's government and the breakaway Somaliland region collapsed, Somaliland's government rejected more talks with Somali government without third party mediations.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">Mohamed Bihi Yonis, Somaliland's foreign minister warned the region would boycott more talks with the Somali government, blaming it for the responsibility of the collapse of the Turkish-sponsored talks.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">"We are committed in staying away from more talks without third party mediations - we made our positions towards that clear to the international community." He told BBC Somali service on Wednesday.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">He suggested IGAD-led mediations for the upcoming talks, referring Ethiopia as the second option.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">"We are urging immediate interventions by the international community." He added. Even though the two sides held two previous talks in Djibouti and Turkey, disputes remain up in the air.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">No comment could be reached from Somali officials on the latest development. Somaliland which declared a unilateral independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991 has been seeking an international recognition, however, their efforts haven't so far proved successful.</span></span></p> <p><span style="font-family: tahoma,geneva,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 14px;">Somalia tries to convince Somaliland to reunite with Somalia, an approach long dismissed by Somaliland.</span></span></p> </article> <article> <h1>Dood: Somaliland iyo Somalia, Burburkii Wadahadalada Yaa Masuuliyadeeda iska leh.</h1> <p>Halyey — Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:01:04 GMT</p> <p><iframe </article> </main></body></html>